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Relations: Japanese Performance 
in Long-Term Perspective 
Gary R. Saxonhouse 
Since the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan’s productivity growth 
has outstripped that of every other major industrialized economy, This impres- 
sive achievement rested on 250 years of growth and structural change prior to 
the opening of  Japan to international trade in the nineteenth century. Japan’s 
superior performance is not the exotic product of a small cluster of distinctive 
economic institutions.  Japan’s rapid economic growth has coexisted with la- 
bor markets, capital markets, and product markets whose structure and orga- 
nization have changed radically over time. Japan’s economic performance has 
been successful for far too long for it to be attributable to any one particular 
configuration of its economic institutions. 
The invariance of Japan’s economic record to a wide variety of institutional 
circumstances is important to keep in mind when considering Japan’s distinc- 
tive trade structure. Japan’s rapid economic growth over the past century has 
gone hand in hand with a very distinctive performance in international trade. 
What Japan sells to the rest of the world has changed continuously and dra- 
matically over time. At the same time, Japan has long imported a distinctively 
low level of manufactured imports. There have been facile attempts to link 
Japan’s controversial trade performance with some of Japan’s distinctive eco- 
nomic institutions.  As with Japan’s economic growth, so Japan’s trade per- 
formance has also been distinctive for too long to be the product of any spe- 
cific configuration of  Japan’s product  markets  and/or factor markets or any 
particular style of state intervention. 
None of this should suggest that Japan’s superior economic performance is 
so deep rooted  as to defy economic explanation. Rather, it is important  to 
focus on the real continuities in Japan’s experience. In particular, Japan’s ge- 
ography is much different from that of the world’s other major industrialized 
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economies. Throughout the past century,  relative to these other economies, 
Japan, while uniquely poorly endowed with natural resources,  has also been 
well  endowed  with  a  high-quality  labor force  and  with  unusually  thrifty 
households. These distinctive  Japanese  circumstances may  go a  long  way 
toward explaining its superior economic growth performance, its meager level 
of manufactured imports, and its lack of participation in intraindustry trade. 
Throughout modem Japanese history, Japan’s international trade has been 
based on the sharp differences in its circumstances from those of the rest of 
the industrialized  world. In recent years, this has put Japan at odds with the 
rest of the major actors in the global economy. Increasingly, international trade 
between most major economies is governed by their similarities, not by their 
differences with each other. Similarities-based trade has none of the politically 
contentious  income redistribution  consequences of  differences-based  trade. 
Similarities-based trade builds alliances for the further reduction of trade bar- 
riers. By contrast, while differences-based trade is the traditional substance of 
international trade theory, nonetheless  it taxes the legitimacy of the interna- 
tional economic system. 
In the first two sections of this paper, Japan’s distinctive economic perform- 
ance will be reviewed. In a third section, how well traditional and newer theo- 
ries of international trade explain Japan’s performance will be examined and 
new statistical tests will be presented. Finally, the implications of the chang- 
ing pattern of Japanese trade for the past, present, and future of Japan’s inter- 
national economic relations will be discussed. 
6.1  Productivity Growth: Prewar and Postwar 
It is all too easy to forget that the various national economic performances 
as presently  observed  may be  surprisingly  deep rooted.  For example, rela- 
tively poor American productivity  performance is arguably an old, old story 
and not the result of a sudden loss in American know-how. U.S.  productivity 
growth has been relatively poor, not only for the past fifteen or twenty years, 
but for the better part of the past century (Maddison 1982,98;  Baumol, Black- 
man, and Wolff  1989).’ Between 1899 and  1913, the U.S. growth rate was 
already lower than that of Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The 
U.S. rate of productivity growth was again below all these countries (except 
for Germany) between  1913 and  1939. While U.S. productivity  grew rela- 
tively rapidly during both world wars, this is in good part a result of the slow- 
down in the growth of other countries. And the American experience relative 
to other countries in the four decades after the Second World War seems to 
differ only  in detail  from its experience in the four pre-Second  World War 
decades (see table 6.1). 
If there are continuities in American performance, there are certainly con- 
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Table 6.1  Cnmparative Levels of Productivity, 1890-1986  (U.S. GDP per 
manhour = 100) 
1890  1938  1950  1986 
France  55  64  44  89 
Germany  58  56  33  19 
Italy  44  49  32  14 
Japan  23  33  14  51 
Sweden  44  59  55  16 
United States  100  100  100  100 
Source: Maddison (1982, 98) and Maddison (1989, 89). 
tinuities  also present  in Japanese  economic performance.  Between the  late 
1940s and the mid- 1980s, Japan’s productivity growth exceeded the perform- 
ance of every other major economy (World Bank  1986). Not only did Japan’s 
productivity grow faster than each of the OECD economies, but it also grew 
faster than any of  the Latin American economies and faster than such Asian 
economies as Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
Like the United  States, however, Japan’s prewar experience resembles its 
postwar experience. Japan grew faster than any other economy in the postwar 
period, but it also grew faster than all other major economies during the seven 
decades between  the Meiji Restoration  (1868) and  1938 (Maddison  1982). 
Indeed, Japan’s distinctive position can be pushed back still further. Already 
in the  1870s and  1880s Japan’s level of economic accomplishment was well 
above the rest of Asia. Only in the 1950s and 1960s would other Asian econ- 
omies reach the levels of  performance  that Japan had achieved eighty years 
earlier (Ohkawa  1978). This impressive achievement,  in turn, rested on al- 
most three hundred years of growth and structural change prior to the opening 
of  Japan to international trade in the  1850s. While Tokugawa Japan missed 
the scientific and industrial revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies, this by no means necessitated economic stagnation. For example, be- 
tween  1600 and 1870, Japanese agricultural output grew at an impressive av- 
erage annual rate of 0.33 percent (Umemura 1973). 
It is no simple matter to account precisely  for these long-standing differ- 
ences in U.S.  and Japanese productivity performance.  There is some reason 
to believe that, among the countries with the capacity to learn from foreign 
experience elsewhere, productivity  bears  a negative  relation  to the level of 
productivity performance  (Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff  1989).*  Following 
the mid-I890s, the United States had a lower rate of productivity growth than 
Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, but, in the mid-l890s, it already 
had the world’s highest level of productivity. By contrast, among these coun- 
tries, Japan had by far the lowest level of productivity in the mid-1890s but 
followed with by far the highest rate of  productivity growth. 
2. For a contrary view, see De Long (1988) 152  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
With hindsight, it is not surprising that there should be substantial conver- 
gence in U.S. and Japanese economic performance. American wealth in the 
late  nineteenth  century rested  on an abundance of  natural  resources  and  a 
skilled population capable of  economically exploiting the latest scientific and 
technological  achievements within the framework of  largely accommodating 
policies of local, state, and national governments (Wright 1990). Despite eco- 
nomic improvement  during the Tokugawa period, and despite the compara- 
tively high basic literacy and numeracy of Japan’s male population in the late 
nineteenth  century, Japan’s familiarity  with Western science and technology 
was still much too limited to overcome its relative dearth of natural resources 
(Dore 1965). 
Over the course of  the late nineteenth  century  and the twentieth century, 
however,  these  conditions  have  changed dramatically.  During  this  period, 
there has been no significant growth in the size or importance of American 
natural resource wealth relative to the American population. Growth in natural 
resource  wealth could not push  America  forward relative to the rest  of  the 
world as had happened  earlier in the nineteenth century. Quite the contrary. 
New mineral discoveries in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Aus- 
tralia and transportation  improvements  in these regions and elsewhere have 
tangibly diminished natural resources as the basis of twentieth-century Amer- 
ican prosperity. 
While natural resource wealth has long since ceased to provide the basis for 
American  productivity  growth, productivity  growth  has not  stagnated.  The 
growth of  America’s physical capital stock and new investments in research 
and development and human resources have continued to raise American pro- 
ductivity. Despite nine decades of relatively slow productivity growth, Amer- 
ica’s high late nineteenth-century  level of productivity and the happy absence 
of wartime destruction have left the United States, at least as late as the end of 
the 1980s, with the highest level of aggregate productivity among the world’s 
major economies. 
The declining  importance of natural resource  wealth could only help Ja- 
pan’s relative performance in the twentieth century. Increasing Japanese thrift 
and increasing Japanese capacity to make use of hitherto remote or unknown 
foreign advances in science and technology have helped Japan to achieve the 
twentieth century’s highest rate of productivity growth (Ohkawa and Rosov- 
sky 1973). Unhappily, in part because of its very low level of productivity in 
the late nineteenth century (and hence the very great potential to benefit from 
foreign  information), and in part because  of  the destruction  resulting  from 
Japan’s disastrous  Pacific  war,  nine decades of relatively rapid productivity 
growth have still left Japan with the lowest level of productivity among the 
world’s major industrialized economies (Maddison 1989, 89). 
It is useful to be reminded of the persistence of relative national economic 
performance. For all the fascination that social scientists may have with insti- 
tutions, relative performance for many economies often seems independent of 
all but the most radical institutional change. Long before permanent employ- 153  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
ment was  a significant element  in Japanese management  strategy, long be- 
fore semiannual  bonuses  were a  significant element  in  Japanese  employee 
compensation,  long  before  stability  was  the hallmark  of  Japanese  macro- 
economic management,  and long before high quality was a familiar attribute 
of Japanese goods, Japanese productivity growth rates were the envy of  the 
world. 
When Japanese labor turnover rates in manufacturing were far higher than 
what was ever experienced  in Europe or the  United  States, when Japanese 
industry exhibited great creativity in producing unprecedentedly poor-quality 
products,  and  when Japanese macroeconomic  management bordered  on the 
chaotic, Japan  was  still  able  to raise  its  rate  of  productivity  improvement 
above what was experienced by other major industralized countries (Saxon- 
house  1976; Saxonhouse and Ranis  1985). The available historical  evidence 
suggests that Japan’s longtime rapid rate of economic improvement does not 
rest on a few distinctive institutional arrangements. Japan’s superior economic 
performance  has persisted even as its most basic economic institutions have 
changed markedly. Japan is under pressure in negotiations  such as the Struc- 
tural Impediments Initiative (SII) to harmonize its economic institutions with 
those of  its trading partners (Saxonhouse  1991). On the basis of  the past re- 
cord, there is certainly considerable reason to believe that Japan can absorb 
such adjustment without much damage to its capacity for continued superior 
economic performance. 
6.2  ’Jkade and Economic Growth 
It is hard to think about the determinants of long-term national economic 
performance without considering the role of international economic relations. 
The classical economics of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill stressed the intimate link 
between the size of markets and productivity impr~vement.~  At an aggregate 
level, the evidence of the past century is mixed. With the radical exception of 
Japan, and possibly France, foreign trade declined in importance between the 
late nineteenth century and the Second World War. During this period, exports 
grew far more slowly than GNP for most major economies.  It is significant 
that Japan, the country with the highest rate of productivity growth, also ex- 
perienced continued rapid growth in the role that foreign trade played within 
its economy. By contrast, as seen in table 6.2, for the rest of the major indus- 
tralized countries, a decline in the importance of foreign trade did not mean a 
decline in the rate of productivity growth. Quite the contrary. For example, as 
noted in table 6.3, during the interwar years, even as foreign trade dropped 
sharply, productivity growth actually accelerated. 
In the decades since 1945, international trade’s importance once again re- 
3. For an interpretation of Japanese economic performance that stresses bonus payments, per- 
manent employment, and macroeconomic stability, see Weitzman (1984) and Freeman and Weitz- 
man (1987). 
4. Smith’s pin factory is the most famous example. 154  Gary R.  Saxonhouse 
Table 6.2  Trade and Overall Economic Activity, 1890-1986 (1890 = 100) 
1890  1938  1986 
Exports  Output  Exports 
France  100  I00  220.9 
Germany  100  100  193.0 
Italy  100  100  161.8 
Japan  100  I00  4,426.5 
Sweden  100  100  351.8 
United States  100  100  310.4 
Output  Exports  Output 
184.4  3,585.3  916.4 
347.2  2,938.1  1,575.4 
242.6  7.721.7  1,282.8 
468.8  93,278.0  5,341.3 
406.5  4,108.1  1,982.8 
369.2  2,555.2  2,108.7 
Source: Maddison (1982, apps. A, F) and Maddison (1989, app. B) 
Table 6.3  Productivity, 1870-1979,  GDP per Manhour in 1970 U.S. Relative 
Prices ($) 
1870  1890  1913  1938  1950  1979 
France  .42  .59  .90  1.69  1.85  7.11 
Germany  .43  .62  .95  I .47  1.40  6.93 
Italy  .44  .47  .72  I .28  1.37  5.83 
Sweden  .31  .45  .83  1.55  2.34  6.71 
United States  .70  1.06  1.67  2.62  4.25  8.28 
Japan  .17  .24  .37  .87  .59  4.39 
Source: Maddison (1982, 212). 
versed course. Instead of declining, international trade has grown much faster 
than GNP for all the major industrialized economies. For some but not all of 
the  major  industrialized  economies, this  explosive  growth  in  international 
trade has gone hand in hand with an acceleration in the rate of productivity 
increase. This has been true most notably for Japan but also for such countries 
as France, Germany, and Italy. 
What accounts for the varied relation between international trade and eco- 
nomic growth over the course of the last century? In view of the experience 
since 1945, it may surprise some to learn that, for much of both the nineteenth 
and the twentieth centuries, many economists believed that, as nations expe- 
rienced economic growth, trade would grow less important (Cooper 1964). In 
1821, Robert Torrens wrote, “As the several nations of the world advance in 
wealth and population,  the commercial intercourse between them must grad- 
ually  become less  important  and  beneficial”  ([  18211  1965,  288).  Torrens 
found that trade resulted from the exchange of manufactures and raw materi- 
als. He argued that, as land became scarcer as a result of population growth, 
the basis for trade would disappear. 
At the turn of the century, Werner Sombart formulated the so-called law of 
the declining importance of  export trade.  Sombart claimed that the gradual 
industrialization of  the agricultural countries and the increasing  capacity to 155  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
consume on the  part  of  the home market would  lead to a reduction of  the 
growth of foreign trade relative to the growth of internal trade and production 
(Sombart 1903). 
Sombart’s general outlook was shared by other major figures in economics 
in the first half of the twentieth century. For all their celebrated differences in 
macroeconomics,  Dennis Robertson and John Maynard Keynes both agreed 
that  foreign  trade  would  be  relatively  less  important  in  future  years.  In  a 
widely read essay entitled “The Future of International Trade” written in the 
1930s and reprinted  approvingly by the American Economic Association  a 
decade later, Robertson wrote that trade would become increasingly  less im- 
portant, partly because economic growth would make it less rewarding, and 
partly because it would be stifled by restrictive commercial policy introduced 
to  reduce  the  risks  inherent  in  dealing  with  foreigners  (Robertson  1938). 
Keynes emphasized demand considerations in his own analysis. Keynes ob- 
served that the income elasticity of  demand for nontradables is much higher 
than it is for imported goods. This means that, as incomes rise with economic 
growth,  an  ever  greater  share will  be  spent  on  locally  produced  services 
(Keynes 1933). 
In the  postwar  period, economists  have  spent  a great deal of  theoretical 
energy investigating how the sources of economic growth, such as technolog- 
ical change and capital accumulation, affect the volume of trade.5 Much of 
this research has been conducted for the elementary case where two countries 
producing two goods with two inputs trade with each other.  In  this  simple 
world, as a country accumulates more of its relatively scarce factor of produc- 
tion,  its  interest  in  trade  declines.  Similarly,  technological  change  in  an 
import-competing industry that saves on the use of a scarce factor of produc- 
tion should also encourage a decline in trade. Technological change that saves 
on a scarce factor in an export industry gives a more complicated result. The 
factor-saving effect of the technological change should encourage a decline in 
trade. This effect is opposed, however, by the cost-reducing effect of techno- 
logical change, which should encourage an expansion of the more efficient 
export industry. The relative strength of these two forces will in any particular 
instance determine the net effect on trade of technological change. 
The simple framework just presented can be adapted to help examine the 
role of trade within the American and Japanese economies over the past cen- 
tury. For much of the period before the Second World War, the United States 
was an importer of  products that used unskilled labor intensively and an ex- 
porter of products that used natural resource products intensively (Crafts and 
Thomas 1986; Wright 1990). If technological change was generally labor sav- 
ing during this period, this should have worked to diminish the significance of 
trade for the American economy. This trend might have been reinforced by the 
natural resource-using  bias that American technological change in all likeli- 
5.  Much of this early literature is reviewed in Bhagwati (1964) 156  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
hood also exhibited during this same period  (Wright  1990). As before,  this 
would have happened if the factor-using bias of this technological change was 
more  significant  than  its  cost-reducing  effect.  Further  reinforcement  might 
have come from the historical antitrade bias of demand noted by Keynes. 
Unlike the United  States during the period before the Second World War, 
Japan  had  an  abundance  of  relatively  unskilled  labor  and  exported  labor- 
intensive products (Yamazawa  1978). During the same period, however, Ja- 
pan’s increasing  capacity  to make use of  imported Western technology re- 
sulted in Japanese technological change being strongly labor saving (Ohkawa 
and Rosovsky  1973). This by itself is probably enough to explain the distinc- 
tive role that international trade played within the Japanese economy during 
the early decades of the twentieth century. Despite international trade becom- 
ing relatively less important for all major economies, and despite a dramatic 
increase in global protectionism,  trade became much more important for the 
Japanese economy  during these years.  Technological  change  that made Ja- 
pan’s  most  abundant  resource  still  more  abundant  surely  accelerated  this 
trend. 
6.3  Intraindustry Bade 
The simplest  factor-endowment-based  theories  of  international trade  are 
able to provide some insight into early twentieth-century trends. They are of 
much less help, however,  in explaining the explosion in international trade 
that has occurred in the four decades since the end of the Second World War. 
The convergence in income levels and in the availability of capital, skills, and 
technology among the world’s major market economies should have worked 
to continue to diminish the relative significance of  international trade  in the 
postwar period. If countries trade to substitute for what is relatively scarce at 
home, the more similar countries become, the less basis there is for trade. 
Assuming that the sharp reversal of the protectionist trends that dominated 
international commercial policy in the early decades of the twentieth century 
is insufficient to explain postwar performance, what significant considerations 
have been left out of the preceding analysis? In the last decade or  so, econo- 
mists have increasingly appreciated that a large share of international trade is 
driven by considerations  other than  simple differences  in local  scarcities of 
factors of production such as land, labor, and capital (Helpman and Krugman 
1985). In particular,  within  many  industries that  are important for interna- 
tional trade, a great variety of goods is produced. Because of scale economies, 
no country is able to produce the full range of differentiated products within 
any industry by itself. In this case, two countries could be identical, but there 
is still a basis for trade. Quite in contrast with interindustry trade, with similar 
tastes,  the more countries resemble each other in their size and their factor 
endowments, the more differentiated  products mutually desired will be pro- 
duced. and the more beneficial trade will be. 157  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
1870  ,279 
1900  .297 
1913  ,345 
1929  ,329 
This new perspective on trade does help explain why international trade has 
grown  more  rapidly  than  production  during  the  postwar  period  (Helpman 
1987). As noted in table 6.4, during the postwar period, the economic condi- 
tions  of  the  sixteen nations  that  dominate  international  trade  have become 
more equal. This decline in the dispersion of the level of economic perform- 
ance has gone, as theory predicts, hand in hand with growth in intraindustry 
trade as a proportion of total trade (Grubel and Lloyd 1975). At least this is 
true if intraindustry trade is measured at the three-digit or four-digit SITC or 
ISIC levels (Lipsey 1976). 
Data on the dispersion of economic performance is also consistent with the 
prewar  experience in  international  trade.  During  the  early  decades  of  the 
twentieth century,  there was no pronounced trend in the dispersion of  eco- 
nomic performance among the major economies, and the relative importance 
of  international  trade  declined.  Intraindustry  trade  was  not  growing  fast 
enough to offset the relatively slow growth of interindustry trade (Hirschman 
1945, chap. 7). 
A postwar world characterized by intraindustry trade might have been ex- 
pected  to be relatively  free of  international  commercial  policy  disputes.  If 
the  vast majority  of  international  trade  is undertaken  by  countries that  are 
quite similar to each other and are primarily exchanging different varieties of 
similar goods produced  using  similar technologies,  such trade  is most  un- 
likely to have the income redistribution implications associated  with factor- 
endowment-based trade. The new exchange of  capital-intensive products for 
labor-intensive products between two countries will change the distribution of 
income between capital and labor in each country. Two-way trade in electrical 
machinery,  however,  is much less likely to produce this result.  Perhaps this 
does explain why industrialized countries in the postwar world have had such 
great success in removing  barriers  among themselves and why this success 
has been confined to trade in manufactures.  As will be seen, it may also ex- 
plain the distinctively contentious relations that Japan has had with other in- 
dustrialized economies. 
For all the importance of intraindustry trade in the past four decades, such 
trade has not been an important element in Japan’s postwar growth. As table 
1950  .383 
1973  ,171 
1987  ,142 
Table 6.4  Coefficient of Variation GDP per Capita of Sixteen Major Economies, 
1870-1987 
Sources: Maddison (1982) and Maddison (1989). 
Note:  The economies in this dispersion index include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Noway, Sweden, Switzer- 
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 158  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
6.5 indicates, Japan is distinctive among major industrialized countries for its 
very limited participation  in intraindustry  trade.  Despite experiencing  a rate 
of growth of foreign trade since the late 1930s that among industrialized coun- 
tries  is exceeded only  by  France and Italy,  Japan’s  intraindustry  trade has 
lagged. 
Japan’s experience has been exceptional because its postwar trade has prob- 
ably grown rapidly for much the same reasons that its prewar trade also grew 
rapidly. Japan’s continuing  capacity to make use of  foreign advances in sci- 
ence and technology and increasingly also its capacity to make efficient use of 
its own  research  and development  resources  has continued  to make labor- 
saving innovations an important source of cost reduction in Japanese export 
industries. Where in the prewar period labor-saving innovations in export in- 
dustries  meant an  unambiguous bias toward  more  trade, in postwar Japan, 
with labor increasingly scarce, this bias has attenuated. This may help explain 
why  in the  last decades of  the twentieth  century, despite a rapid stream of 
productivity-enhancing  technological innovations, Japanese trade has not out- 
stripped the growth of  the Japanese GNP to anywhere near the extent of  what 
was experienced in the prewar decades. Among the major industrialized econ- 
omies examined here, Japan has experienced the smallest rise in its trade-to- 
GNP ratio. 
While economic theory suggests that, given Japan’s distinctive geography 
and factor endowments, it is not surprising that Japan is a relatively  meager 
participant in intraindustry trade, there remains a strong suspicion among Ja- 
pan’s trading partners that Japanese government policies are somehow respon- 
sible.6 In  this event, the conjecture that Japan’s meager participation  in in- 
traindustry trade might be explained by Japan’s distinctive factor endowments 
certainly needs to be subjected to a careful empirical test. 
6.4  A Factor-Endowment-Based Theory of Intraindustry ’Ikade7 
Assume that all manufactured goods are differentiated by country of origin. 
Given the same homothetic  preferences  usually  assumed in empirical  work 
making use of  Heckscher-Ohlin-style trade models, each economy will con- 
sume identical  proportions of  each  variety  of  each good.* This means  that 
country  j’s import and export of  good i will be given byy 
6. Concern about Japan’s meager participation in intraindustry trade dates from the late 1960s 
(Saxonhouse 1972). Helpman and Krugman (1985) show that, the more different are two coun- 
tries’ factor endowments, the less the role that intraindustry trade will play in their total trade. 
7. This paper extends earlier research on this subject (Saxonhouse 1989). See also the survey 
on earlier empirical work on Japanese trade structure in Saxonhouse and Stem (1989). 
8. See, e.g., the analysis in Learner (1984) and Saxonhouse (1983). 
9. Lawrence (1987) makes use of variants of (4) and (4’). 159  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
Table 6.5  Intraindustry lkade Indices for Manufacturing, 1975-88 
1975  1980  1985  1988 
Japan  26  28  26  33 
United States  62  66  61  60 
France  78  82  82  81 
Germany  58  66  67  69 
Korea  36  40  49  N.A. 
Sources; lwata (1991, 333-69);  and TsushosangyGsho (1990, 208). 
where MI: = imports of good i by country j,  Q,,  production  of  good  i in 
country j,  Q, = E,Q,  = global production of good  i, nl = EQL, = GNP of 
country j,  11  = Z,H,  = global GNP and S, = II/n = share of country j in 
global GNP; but 
(3) 
where  Ls, = endowment  of  factor  of  production  s  in  economy  j, and 
WI, = rental for factor of production s. 
Following  the  approach  taken  in  interindustry  trade  analyses based  on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, if factor price equalization is assumed, then, by 
Hotelling’s lemma, if  II, is differentiated with respect to output price,lD 
(4) 
s=  I 
where R,, is a function of the parameters of H,  and output prices,  which are 
assumed to be constant. 
Substituting (3) and (4)  into (1) and (2),  we get 
and 
(6) 
N  NN 
X,;  =  RJL, -  D~JS,Lr,,  i = 1,  . . . ,  N, 
where B;  and D;r  are functions of parameters of H,,  and where output prices 
will  be  constant  under  the  assumptions  already  made.  The linear  factor- 
endowment terms in (5) represent economy j’s demand for good  i, while the 
5=  I  3=1r=l 
10. The GNP function II, has been defined to allow for differentiated products and economies 
of  scale. Following Helpman and Krugman (1985),  this can be done by  including optimal firm 
scale in  II,. Provided that optimal firm scale is small relative to market size, change in industry 
output can be achieved by changes in the number of  firms in the industry. Firms are assumed to be 
identical. This means that, at an industry level, there will be constant returns to scale. 160  Gary R.  Saxonhouse 
linear terms in (6) represent  economy j’s supply of good  i.  The interaction 
terms in equations (5) and (6) represent economyj’s demand for its domesti- 
cally produced variety j of good i.  MI; in (5)  can be interpreted as that part of 
economy j’s demand for good i that cannot be satisfied by the domestically 
produced variety j.  X,;  in (6) is the supply of variety j of good i available after 
domestic demand has been met. Neither M;  nor X:  can be negative. If (5) is 
subtracted from (6), net exports will be given by” 
s=  I 
Net exports reflect the balance between the domestic demand for and supply 
of good i by economy j.  Since domestic demand for the domestic variety of 
good i appears in both equation (5) and equation (6), these terms cancel out in 
equation (7). 
By contrast with (5)  and (6), (7) is the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin interin- 
dustry trade equation with net exports as a linear function of factor endow- 
ments (Saxonhouse 1983; Leamer 1984). Within the Heckscher-Ohlin frame- 
work, the nonlinear terms in (5)  and (6) cancel out.12 
The presence  of factor-endowment  interaction terms in equations (5) and 
(6) presents a number of estimation problems.  Given the desire to use a rela- 
tively homogeneous country sample, which means that only a relatively small 
number of  observations are available, and given the large number of interac- 
tion terms, precise estimation of  (5) and (6) would be difficult. Alternatively, 
recall from (3) and (5) that 
K  KK 
11.  In the common case that the number of goods exceeds the number of factors (N > K),  trade 
will likely be indeterminate. In theory, this should mean that empirical work using such cross- 
national models should fare poorly (Petri 1991). In practice, such models do very well in explain- 
ing cross-national trade patterns  (Leamer  1984; Saxonhouse  1983). How  can this paradox be 
resolved? One convention might allow that in the limit there are approximately the same large 
number of factors as commodities and that trade patterns are determinate. Missing data present 
problems for estimation, but not problems for actual trade flows. If  these missing factor endow- 
ments are statistically orthogonal  to the factor endowments for which data are available, their 
absence will not bias estimation of the model. If this view is wrong, and if there are many more 
goods than  factors of  production  in  the  international economic  system,  production and trade 
should be highly specialized. In fact, what is generally observed, at the level of disaggregation 
relevant for empirical work, is just the kind of incomplete specialization suggested by  a system 
where the numbers of goods and factors are the same. 
12. Since (7) can be derived from the intraindustry gross trade equations (5) and (6), this should 
demonstrate the compatibility of these two approaches. Contrary to what authors such as Zysman 
and Tyson (1983) allege,  the incorporation of scale economies and product differentiation into 
conventional models of  international trade in order to account for intraindustry trade need  not 
invalidate the Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation of  intraindustry trade. 161  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
Dividing through by n,  we get 
where  Fi = Q,/n = global  sector  i  as  a  proportion  of  global  GNP  and 
Rz = Ri/II. 
Equation (8), like equation (7), is a simple linear function of factor endow- 
ments. When estimated together with equation (7), it can be used to test the 
hypothesis that the variation of intraindustry trade participation across coun- 
tries is caused, not by government trade policies, but by  differences in factor 
endowments. 
The structure embodied in equations (7) and (8) results from relaxing many 
of the strictest assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model in order to incor- 
porate hitherto neglected phenomena. Still further relaxation of assumptions 
is possible. Following earlier work (Saxonhouse 1983, 1989; Bowen, Lea- 
mer,  and Sveikauskas 1987), suppose that the assumption that strict factor 
price equalization across countries is dropped. Suppose rather that interna- 
tional trade equalizes factor prices only when factor prices are normalized for 
differences in quality. For example, observed international differences in the 
compensation of  ostensibly unskilled labor may be  accounted for by  differ- 
ences in labor quality. Instead of (7) and (8), we have 
N 





-L=F,- 2  RzaJsj, 
K 
i = 1, . . . ,  N,  n,  s=  I 
where as = quality of factor s. 
6.5  Estimation Procedures 
Equations (7') and (8') can be  estimated for N  commodity groups from 
cross-national data. a, is not directly observable but can be estimated using 
(7) and (8) (Saxonhouse 1983, 1989). Formally, the estimation of (7') and (8') 
with a, differing across countries and unknown is a multiplicative errors in 
variables problem. Instrumental variables methods will allow consistent esti- 
mation of the (R, -  BL)  and the Rz  . For any given cross section, the a, will 
not be identified. In the particular specification adopted in (7') and (87, how- 
ever, at any given time, there are 2N cross sections that contain the identical 
independent variables. This circumstance can be exploited to permit consist- 162  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
ent estimation  of  the as.13  Since the same error will recur in equation after 
equation  owing to the unobservable  quality  terms, it is possible to use this 
recurring error to obtain consistent estimates of the quality terms. These esti- 
mates of  a, can then be used to adjust the factor endowment data in (7’) and 
(8’) to obtain more efficient estimates of the (R,? - B:)  and the Rt. 
6.6  Estimating Interindustry ’Ikade Equations and Import Share 
Equations 
Earlier  work  with a related  empirical  framework (Saxonhouse  1989) has 
been  criticized  because  the  sample used  in  its  estimation  included  many 
poorer countries that had substantial levels of protection  (Tyson  1989). The 
estimated coefficients of  a framework  such as (7’) and (8’) will embody the 
average level of protection of the sample used in its estimation. It is useful to 
know that, after due allowance has been made for its distinctive factor endow- 
ment, Japanese trade structure differs little from that of other advanced coun- 
tries that are thought of  as having relatively  low levels of protection.  It may 
be quite a different matter if Japanese trade structure differs little from that of 
mixed samples of  countries, some with low levels of protection,  others with 
extremely high  levels.14 With  this in mind, equations (7’) and (8’) are esti- 
mated with data taken from the relatively homogeneous sample of twenty-four 
economies listed in table 6.6 for 1983 for each of the sixty-one trade sectors 
listed in table 6.7. 
The six factor endowments used in this estimation include directly produc- 
tive capital stock, educational attainment, labor, petroleum reserves, coal, and 
arable land. Unlike the interindustry  trade equation (7’),  the dependent vari- 
ables in the import share equation (8‘) will never be negative,  but they will 
occasionally be zero. As seen in table 6.8, some of the import share equations 
will contain some zero observations. As suggested (Saxonhouse  1989), equa- 
tion (8’) should be specified as a Tobit mode1.I5 
The results of estimating equations (7’) and (8‘) are given in tables 6.9- 
6.12. Note that thirty-eight of the sixty-one net trade equations and thirty-four 
of  the sixty-one import share equations are statistically significant. When all 
122 trade equations are taken jointly as a system, they are statistically signifi- 
13. For further explanation of the statistical techniques used here, see Saxonhouse (1989). 
14. In general, less advanced economies impose more protection than the most advanced econ- 
omies (Honma and Hayami 1986).  As noted (Saxonhouse 1989), this development-related protec- 
tion can be explained by changes in the levels of the factor endowments. Typically, the less scarce 
the factor endowments, the less the protection. Under these conditions, using a mixed sample of 
advanced and developing economies will not pose much of a problem for interpreting findings 
about Japan because development-related protection in the sample will not be incorporated into 
the estimated coefficients. 
15. The Tobit estimation methods used for equation (8’) are described in Greene (1981, 1983) 
and in Chung and Goldberger (1984). 163  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
Table 6.6  Country Sample for Empirical Work 
Australia 
Austria 























Petroleum, petroleum products (PETR033) 
Crude materials, crude fertilizer (MAT27) 
Metalliferous ores, metal scrap (MAT28) 
Coal, coke briquettes (MAT32) 
Gas, natural and manufactured (MAT34) 
Electrical energy (MAT35) 
Nonferrous metals (MAT68) 
Wood, lumber, cork (FOR24) 
Pulp, waste paper (FOR25) 
Wood, cork manufactures (FOR63) 
Paper, paperboard (FOR64) 
Fruit, vegetables (TROP5) 
Sugar, sugar preparations, honey (TROP6) 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices (TROP7) 
Beverages (TROPll) 
Crude rubber (TROP23) 
Live animals (ANLO) 
Meat, meat preparations (ANLI) 
Dairy products, eggs (ANL2) 
Fish, fish preparations (ANL3) 
Hides, skins, furskins, undressed (ANL21) 
Crude animal, vegetable minerals (ANL29) 
Animal, vegetable oils, fats, processed (ANL45) 
Animals, n.e.s. (ANL94) 
Cereals, cereal preparations (CER4) 
Tobacco, tobacco manufactures (CER12) 
Oil seeds, oil nuts, oil kernels (CER22) 
Textile fibers (CER26) 
Animal oils, fats (CER41) 
Fixed vegetable oils (CER42) 
Nonmetallic mineral manufactures (LAB66) 
Furniture (LAB82) 
Travel goods, handbags (LAB83) 
(continued) 
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Table 6.7  (continued) 
Clothing (LAB84) 
Footwear (LAB85) 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles n.e.s. (LAB89) 
Postal pack not classified according to kind (LAB91) 
Special transactions not classified according to kind (LAB93) 
Coins, nongold, noncurrent (LAB96) 
Leather, dressed furskins (CAP61) 
Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. (CAP62) 
Textile, yarn, fabrics (CAP65) 
Iron and steel (CAP67) 
Manufactures of metal (CAP69) 
Sanitary fixtures, fittings (CAP81) 
Machinery, other than electrical (MACH71) 
Electrical machinery (MACH72) 
Transport equipment (MACH73) 
Professional goods, watches, instruments (MACH86) 
Firearms, ammunition (MACH95) 
Chemical elements, compounds (CHEM51) 
Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (CHEM52) 
Dyeing, tanning, coloring matter (CHEM53) 
Medicinal, pharmaceutical products (CHEM54) 
Essential oils, perfume matter (CHEM55) 
Fertilizers, manufactured (CHEM546) 
Explosives, pyrotechnic products (CHEM57) 
Plastic materials, cellulose (CHEM58) 
Chemical materials, n.e.s. (CHEM59) 
cant, with F(53, 2753)  o5  = 3.61  .I6 For individual factor endowments, out of 
sixty-one estimated net trade equations,  capital has significant coefficients in 
twenty-seven, labor has nineteen, education has twenty, oil has thirteen, coal 
has sixteen,  and land has twenty. By marked contrast with the net trade re- 
sults, the sixty-one import share equations have a great many more significant 
coefficients. What are the determinants of  import shares? Capital once again 
has the most significant coefficients with thirty-six, labor and education have 
twenty-nine,  oil has twenty-eight,  coal has twenty-four,  and arable land has 
thirty-four. 
Consistent with earlier findings  from a diverse set of economies (Saxon- 
house  1989), the determinants of import shares do appear quite similar to the 
determinants of net trade.” Physical capital is a source of comparative disad- 
vantage in the net trade in natural resources and a source of comparative ad- 
vantage  in  the  net  trade of  capital-intensive  manufactures,  machinery,  and 
16. The joint test used here is described in McElroy (1977) 
17. Lawrence (1987) suggests the contrary. 165  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
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chemical products. Endowments of capital also encourage the imports of nat- 
ural resource products and labor-intensive products while again discouraging 
the imports of  capital-intensive manufactures, machinery, and chemical prod- 
ucts. 
By  contrast  with  physical  capital,  labor’s role as a determinant  of  trade 
patterns is more complex.  Generally speaking, labor is a source of compara- 
tive  advantage  in  the  net  trade  of  capital-intensive  manufactures,  la- 
bor-intensive  manufactures,  and  chemical  products.  At  the  same  time, 
endowments of labor also discourage the imports of most nonnatural resource- 
related manufactures.  Human capital’s role is also quite complicated. While 
human capital is a source of comparative disadvantage in net trade in natural 
resource-related  products  and a source of comparative advantage in the net 
trade of most nonnatural resource-related  manufactures, its role as a determi- 
nant of import shares is subtle. Endowments of human capital encourage im- 
port of tropical products, animal products, labor-intensive manufactures, and 166  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
Table 6.9  Estimation of Equation (7’): 
(X: -  M;)  = No + N,  Capital + N, Labor + N, Educ. 
























































































































































































**F(6,17),  = 2.70. 
capital-intensive manufactures. At the same time, endowments of human cap- 
ital strongly discourage imports of machinery and chemical products. 
Surprisingly,  oil and arable land appear to have quite the opposite effect 
from coal on trade structure. While encouraging the net export of natural re- 
source products,  factor endowments  of  oil and  arable  land are  a  source of 
comparative disadvantage for most nonnatural resource manufactures and en- 
courage  the import, in  particular,  of  labor-intensive manufactures,  capital- 
intensive manufactures,  and chemical products. Coal’s effect is much the op- 
posite.  Endowments  of coal  are a source of comparative advantage for net Table 6.10  Number of Significant Coefficients  in Equation (7') by Sectoral Grouping, Factor Endowment, and 
Sign 
Capital  Labor  Education  Petroleum  Coal  Land 
+-+-+-+-+-+- 
___~~~~~ 
(7) Petroleum and raw materials 
(PETR033, MAT27-68) 
(4) Forest products (FOR2464) 
(5) Tropical products 
(TROP5-23) 
(8) Animal products (ANLO-94) 
(8) Cereals (CER4-12) 
(9)  Labor-intensive manufactures 
(6)  Capital-intensive manufactures 
(5) Machinery (MACH71-95) 
(9)  Chemical products (CHEM51- 
(LAB6696) 
(CAP61-8  1) 
59) 
"3'1  "2O1  "3' 
al  all 
"11  "2al  al 
a2a1  =I  "1  "2' 
222=  a32a1  "11 
212'21  =2a2n1 
4a214a  "311  a3 
4a224a1  "3'  a4 
413221  '24'  "4 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses at the left of sectoral grouping rows indicate the number of equations in each sectoral grouping. 
significant coefficients in this cell. 168  Gary R.  Saxonhouse 
Table 6.1  1  Estimation of Equation (8’): 
M,’ 
*I 
-  = Po + P,  Capital + P,  Labor + P,  Educ. 
+ P, Oil  + P, Coal  + P, Land Ara. 






















































































































































































**Significant at the .05 level, F(6,17),,  = 2.70. 
trade  in capital-intensive  manufactures,  machinery, and chemical products. 
Coal endowments also discourage the imports of  most nonnatural resource 
manufactures in addition to discouraging the imports of oil. 
18. Despite a sample restricted to relatively high-income countries, the findings presented here 
are quite similar to the results obtained when a more comprehensive sample of  countries is used 
(Saxonhouse 1989). Table 6.12  Number  of Significant Coefficients  in Equation (8') by Sector Grouping, Factor Endowment, and 
Sign 
Capital  Labor  Education  Petroleum  Coal  Land  -~~-~~ 
F,  +  -  +  -  +  -  +  -  +  -  +  - 
(7) Petroleum and raw 
materials (PETRO33, 
MAT27-68)  31  1  1  1  "1  a2  a1  =3 
(FOR24-64)  21  a21  "I  a2  =2 
(TROP5-23)  421  122121 
(ANLCL94)  531  1221313213 
(8) Cereals (CER412)  632  '222121  1  a5 
ufactures (LAB66-96)  6  3  2  '421222213 
81)  513  1231221341 
(MACH71-95)  413  13141  1 
(CHEM5  1-59)  726141431  "431 
(4) Forest products 
(5)  Tropical products 
(8) Animal products 
'12 
(9) Labor-intensive man- 
(6) Capital-intensive 
manufactures (CAP61- 
(5)  Machinery 
(9) Chemical products 
"422 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses at the left of sectoral grouping rows indicate the number of  equations in each sectoral grouping. 
significant coefficients in this cell. 170  Gary R. Saxonhouse 
6.7  Is Japanese lkade Behavior Distinctive? 
Tables 6.9-6.12  report results where equations (7’) and (8‘) have been es- 
timated using  1983 data but without using Japanese observations.  Equations 
(7’) and (8’) have also been reestimated including Japan but successively ex- 
cluding Canada, the United States, and Singapore from the sample. In an ef- 
fort to test  whether Japanese trade  patterns  are distinctively  different  from 
the  patterns  observed by  other countries, and  following  suggestions  from 
Srinavasan and Hamada (1989), tolerance intervals have been constructed for 
Japanese  trade  flows using  the trade  equations that  were estimated  without 
Japanese  observations.  Unlike forecast intervals (Saxonhouse  1989), which 
focus on particular parameters, tolerance intervals, by indicating the probabil- 
ity with which a given proportion of a population distribution will fall within 
a particular  range, provide a conceptually  sound  test of  whether  Japanese 
trade patterns  are distinctively  different from the patterns observed by other 
countries.  l9  Observations  on Japanese import shares and Japanese net trade 
that lie outside the tolerance interval can be considered out of line with what 
might be expected given the experience of other countries. 
To  the extent that  tolerance  intervals constructed  with non-Japanese  evi- 
dence can capture Japan’s trade structure, it is difficult to argue that Japan’s 
sectoral policies are yielding distinctive outcomes. It is very important to note 
here that this does not necessarily mean that Japan has a liberal trade regime. 
If all countries with relatively small amounts of arable land protect their wheat 
growers, Japan can protect its wheat growers, but its behavior will not appear 
distinctive. At the same time, a change in Japanese trade policy will yield an 
increase in Japanese wheat imports. It is also important to note that, even if 
observations on Japanese import shares and Japanese net trade lie outside the 
tolerance interval, this result need not be attributed to the presence of Japanese 
trade barriers. There may be other important variables, for example, foreign 
trade barriers that have also been excluded from the model being employed 
here. 
The tolerance interval results are presented in tables 6.13-6.16.  Of the 122 
actual observations  on Japanese net trade and Japanese  import  shares,  only 
seventeen  lie outside  the constructed tolerance  intervals.  This  is  virtually 
identical to the finding for Canadian net trade and import shares. By contrast, 
ten observations on U.S. net trade and import shares and no less than twenty- 
three observations on Singaporean net trade and import shares lie outside the 
tolerance intervals. These findings appear broadly consistent with earlier re- 
19. Saxonhouse (1989) uses forecast intervals to test whether Japanese trade patterns are dis- 
tinctive. For any given probability, forecast intervals will almost always be narrower than toler- 
ance intervals. Using forecast intervals instead of tolerance intervals biases any test in favor of 
accepting the hypothesis that Japanese performance is distinctive. To the extent that this hypothe- 
sis is largely rejected when forecast intervals are used,  it  will  also be rejected when tolerance 
intervals are used (Christ 1966). 171  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
Table 6.13  Extreme Observations on Net 'kade, 1983 
Japan  United States 
Fruit, vegetables  Plastic materials, cellulose 
Cereal, cereal preparations  Clothing 
Wood, cork manufactures  Dairy products, eggs 
Pulp, waste paper  Transport equipment 
Leather, dressed furskins 
Crude materials, crude fertilizers 
Manufactures of metal 
Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 
Professional goods, watches, and instruments 
Canada  Singapore 
Fish, fish preparations 
Wood, lumber, cork 
Wood, cork manufactures 
Pulp, waste paper 
Wood, lumber, cork 
Wood, cork manufactures 
Fruit, vegetables 
Crude animals, vegetable, minerals 
Paper, paperboard 
Manufactures of metal  Rubber manufactures 
Nonmetallic mineral manufactures 
Hide, skins, furskins, undressed 
Manufactures of  metal 
Machinery other than electrical 
Electrical machinery 
Professional goods, watches, instruments 
Plastic materials, cellulose 
Table 6.14  Does (XTj -  M:,) Lie Outside the Estimated Tolerance Interval? Test 
Statistic for Case where 95 Percent of Population Distribution Is 
Included in Tolerance Interval with Probability .95 
Japan  U.S.  Canada  Singapore 
PETR033  .75  2.32  1.05  .82 
MAT27  3.78*  .92  1.88  1.67 
MAT28  2.15  2.88  1.72  1.61 
MAT32  1.91  3.03  2.14  2.61 
MAT34  1.45  1.22  1.52  1.38 
MAT35  1.16  2.36  2.45  1.99 
MAT68  2.12  1.52  2.10  .92 
FOR24  2.70  2.35  3.88*  4.01* 
FOR25  3.72*  1.97  1.54  2.79 
FOR63  21.58*  2.62  4.41*  4.67* 
FOR64  3.25  1.74  3.85*  3.24 
TROP5  4.68*  .41  2.44  3.86* 
TROP6  .62  1.81  .92  2.07 
TROP7  1.14  1.92  2.63  1.68 
TROPl1  .83  .77  1.56  .92 
TROP23  .41  1.76  2.04  2.33 
ANLO  .36  .62  .92  1.36 
ANLl  2.87  1.63  1.76  1.14 
(continued) 172  Gary R.  Saxonhouse 
Table 6.14  (continued) 
























































































































































































































* = observation lies outside tolerance interval. 173  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
Table 6.15  Extreme Observations on Import Shares, 1979 
Japan  United States 
Wood, cork manufactures 
Meat, meat preparations 
Cereal, cereal preparations 
Feedstuff for animals 
Tobacco, tobacco manufactures 
Footwear 
Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 
Textiles, yarn,  fabrics 
Canada 
Metalliferous  ore, metal scrap 
Clothing 
Footwear 




Wood, lumber, cork 
Paper, paperboard 
Coal, coke briquettes 
Wood, cork manufactures 
Oil seeds, oil nuts and nut kernels 
Leather dressed furskins 
Rubber manufactures  Cereal, cereal preparations 
Manufactures of metal 
Machinery, other than electrical 
Fruit, vegetables 
Sugar, sugar preparations 
Oil seeds, oil nuts, oil kernels 
Textile fibers 
Crude animals, vegetables and minerals 
Leather, dressed furskins 
Rubber manufactures 
Machinery other than electrical 
Transport equipment 
Medicinal pharmaceutical products 
Plastic materials, cellulose 
Table 6.16  Does M;/IIj Lie Outside the Estimated Tolerance Interval? Test 
Statistic for Case Where 95 Percent of Population Distribution Is 
Included in Tolerance Interval with Probability .95 
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Table 6.16  (continued) 


































































































































































































































* = observation lies outside tolerance interval. 175  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
search  that  used  more  a  heterogeneous  sample  of  countries (Saxonhouse 
1989). Whatever Japanese trade policies (and/or informal barriers) may have 
been, more than likely, with the possible exception of a number of agricultural 
sectors, they have not been a major determinant of  what is distinctive about 
Japanese trade patterns. 
Following a suggestion by Bowen (1989), the significance of  this finding 
can be further explored by using estimated equations (7’) and (8’) to replicate 
intraindustry trade indices similar to those presented in table 6.5 By succes- 
sively reestimating equations (7‘) and (8’) and a related GNP equation, each 
time excluding a different country, not just Japan, Canada, the United States, 
and Singapore, but also each of ten other countries, it is possible to examine 
how the factor-endowment-based explanation of  net trade and import shares 
can also account for intercountry variations in intraindustry trade. The results 
of replicating intraindustry trade indices for 1979 and 1986 using export and 
import values that have been  forecast from equations (7’) and (8’) and the 
associated GNP function are presented in table 6.17. 
While it could hardly  be expected that  intraindustry  trade  indices  using 
forecasted trade flows would exactly match the indices constructed using ac- 
tual data, as seen in table 6.17 the general patterns of cross-national partici- 
pation  in  intraindustry trade  in  both  1979 and  1988 are  clearly  captured. 
Countries such as Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
that are very active participants in intraindustry  trade are forecast as active 
Table 6.17  Intraindustry Manufacturing Trade Indices, 1979 and 1988 (36 
sectors) 
Country  1979  1988 
Actual  Forecast  Actual  Forecast 
Australia  .38  .43  .40  .42 
Canada  .I4  .66  .78  .I3 
Finland  .59  .60  .62  .58 
France  .79  .I3  .83  .75 
Italy  .60  .61  .64  .61 
Netherlands  .I1  .83  .I3  .85 
Norway  .51  .61  .63  .62 
Sweden  .I3  .59  .70  .56 
United Kingdom  .82  ,230  .84  .84 
United States  .65  .58  .69  .63 
Switzerland  .61  .7  1  .64  .I5 
Belgium and Luxembourg  .85  .69  .88  .75 
Germany  .68  .64  .69  .64 
Japan  .35  .32  .39  .37 
Singapore  .48  .42  .58  .54 176  Gary R.  Saxonhouse 
participants. The behavior of countries such as Australia, Singapore, and Ja- 
pan that have been much less active participants in such trade are also accu- 
rately  forecast.  The substantial changes in the participation in intraindustry 
trade for many countries between 1979 and 1988 are also accurately forecast. 
The results  for Japan are particularly  instructive.  Consistent with  the  new 
theory of intraindustry trade, they demonstrate that Japan is a relatively mea- 
ger participant  because,  with  its  very  distinctive  pattern  of  factor  endow- 
ments, it does remain quite unlike its trading partners. As shown in table 6.17, 
in the late 1980s Japan’s participation in intraindustry trade has been increas- 
ing. This primarily reflects the increasing capital intensity  and skill intensity 
of many of Japan’s substantial trading partners in East and Southeast Asia. 
6.8  Finale 
Regardless  of  its  determinants,  Japan’s  distinctive  pattern  of  trade  has 
posed  a  continuing  dilemma  for  Japanese  international  economic  policy. 
There have always been important political constituencies in the major indus- 
trialized  nations  supporting  trade  in  otherwise unavailable  natural  resource 
products.  There has  also been  great  support in  the postwar  period  for the 
highly beneficial  and minimally disruptive trade based  on intraindustry spe- 
cialization. A large proportion of the total volume of post-World  War I1 trade 
has been  of these two types.  Together, constituencies supporting these two 
types of trade have successively pushed the almost unprecedented  liberaliza- 
tion of the postwar international commercial system.*O 
Japan  is neither  a natural  resource  products-based  exporter  nor  a major 
participant in intraindustry trade. Japan’s focus on interindustry specialization 
has meant that, at the best case, expansion of Japanese trade improves foreign 
welfare on net while altering the  almost always politically  sensitive foreign 
income distribution. At worst, an expansion of Japanese trade can reduce for- 
eign welfare by undermining the economic rents embodied in the profits and 
in the high wages of foreign industries producing tradable goods (Krugman 
1984; Katz and Summers 1989). While there is very good reason to believe 
that, on net, the growth in Japanese trade has been beneficial, to date Japanese 
trade has not created powerful  liberal trade constituencies within its trading 
partners.  Rather, the faster-than-desired structural adjustment imposed on its 
trading partners has nurtured protectionist interests. As long as the Japanese 
economy was relatively  small, complaints were localized, confined to partic- 
ular  sectors and, at the general level, relatively  easily overwhelmed by  the 
constituencies favoring more liberal trade. As Japan has become a much larger 
force  in  the  global  economy,  and  with  its  influence  magnified  by  needless 
mismanagement  of  the  American economy,  attention has come to focus on 
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the disruptive features of  international trade at the expense of trade’s many 
benefits. 
As discussed earlier, mutual beneficial interindustry trade is based on the 
existence of differences among countries. By contrast, mutually beneficial in- 
traindustry  trade  is based  on similarities  among countries.  From the  tradi- 
tional  Japanese perspective, it  is doubtless puzzling  that  foreign diplomats 
continually request that Japan become ever more like its trading partners. It is 
often argued that removing what is distinctive about Japan might diminish the 
basis for trade. Ironically, foreign diplomats, however, are approaching Japan 
from a different perspective.  By asking Japan to harmonize a wide array of its 
domestic economic practices with foreign practices, they are hoping to create 
a basis for greatly expanded, mutually beneficial intraindustry trade between 
Japan and its trading partners. If harmonization by itself helps to shore up the 
tattered  legitimacy  of  the international  trading system, then the hard diplo- 
macy required to achieve this end may well be worth the great effort that has 
been expended. If, however, the only criteria for success are major changes in 
trade  structure and trade volume, the research  presented  here continues  to 
support  the position  that increased  frustration  and ill will  may be the only 
outcome of  such efforts. Japan will become a major participant in intraindus- 
try  trade only as the rest of  natural resource-poor  East and Southeast Asia 
converge to the Japanese level of development. 
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Comment  Takatoshi Ito 
The ground that this paper covers is very broad, ranging from 1600 to 1991, 
from macro to micro, and from economics to politics. The paper is extremely 
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informative,  reflecting  Saxonhouse’s long history  of academic work on the 
Japanese economy and his recent experience on the Council of Economic Ad- 
visers dealing with Japan politically. Saxonhouse discusses various interesting 
topics, but I will limit my comments to two, intraindustry trade and the Struc- 
tural Impediments Initiative (SII). 
Intraindustry trade issues have been hotly debated by Robert Lawrence and 
Gary  Saxonhouse.  They do not disagree on the fact that Japan, along with 
Australia, is an outlier among industrial countries, with a very low intraindus- 
try  trade  index.  Lawrence  argues that, with various  factors controlled,  the 
index remains low, explaining the fact as a reflection of either the Japanese 
market being closed or the Japanese minds being “closed.” Saxonhouse argues 
that a special endowment pattern, a strong comparative advantage of manufac- 
turing sectors, and a geographic location far away from other similar econo- 
mies explain the low index. For the purposes of this debate, the recent rise of 
other Asian economies provides a good opportunity to judge which side is 
right.  Because of geographic proximity,  similarity in resource endowments, 
and close affinities among cultural heritages,  Asian nations will leave Japan 
with  no excuse for not  increasing  intraindustry  imports,  once these  Asian 
economies become strong industrial powers,  which should be some time in 
the not-too-distant future. 
Put simply, it is not surprising not to see Lincoln Continentals on Japanese 
streets, but it would be surprising not to see Hyundai Excels and Sonatas; it is 
not surprising not to see Compaq computers in Japan, but surprising not to see 
any by Leading Edge; and it is not surprising not to see Philips color televi- 
sions, but surprising not to see Goldstars. 
Japan placed itself in two dilemmas in the  1980s. First, Japanese policy- 
makers like to deal with “free traders”  in Washington.  On the other hand, 
Japanese policymakers  believe in long-term relationships,  nonmarket  (inter- 
nal) labor markets, industrial policies, a no-bankruptcy policy, and policy in- 
terventions in general. Second, Japan has defended some policy measures on 
the grounds of  its own “uniqueness.”  Rice should not be imported because 
rice for the Japanese is “unique.” The Japanese are “unique” in their thrift and 
in the relationship between a paternalistic firm and its loyal employees. The 
uniqueness produced a high saving rate, high labor quality, and a stable rela- 
tionship. These arguments were used against Japan by revisionists: “If you are 
so unique, why don’t we treat you differently.” 
Regarding SII, it is puzzling why the United States asks Japan to become 
better and more efficient. It is not quite true that SII make Japan more efficient. 
From the Japanese point of view, U.S. demands are often treated as “foreign 
pressure” to shift from producer’s surplus to consumer’s surplus. 181  Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations 
Comment  Yun-Wing Sung 
I very much enjoyed Gary Saxonhouse’s wide-ranging  paper,  which argues 
that the contrast in U.S. and Japanese productivity performance is extremely 
persistent and is independent of all but the most radical institutional change. 
While the paper gives plenty of historical evidence on the persistence of na- 
tional economic performance, the case is overstated.  Although the paper ar- 
gues that national economic performances “may be surprisingly deep rooted ,” 
it does not elaborate on what those roots are from a theoretical  standpoint. 
Without a theory of  productivity  growth, arguments based on historical evi- 
dence alone leave much to be desired. Saxonhouse seems to have an implicit 
theory of productivity in mind, although he does not spell out what it is. For 
example, the paper argues in the closing sections that the Structural Impedi- 
ments Initiative (SII) is likely to improve Japan’s competitiveness.  If  Saxon- 
house is right,  SII clearly  represents  a case where institutional change does 
affect competitiveness, and economic performance is not really so indepen- 
dent of  institutional changes. 
The closest that Saxonhouse comes to stating a theory of productivity is his 
statement that, “among the countries with the capacity to learn from foreign 
experience elsewhere, productivity  bears  a negative relation to the level of 
productivity performance,” and he explains the contrast in U.S. and Japanese 
productivity growth performance by the countries’ difference in productivity 
levels.  However, such an explanation of  productivity  growth contradicts the 
central theme of the paper, that productivity performance is extremely persis- 
tent and deep rooted  because differential productivity  growth will converge 
over time and the superior productivity growth of Japan will disappear. In this 
case, Japan’s  superior productivity  growth  is only a historical accident: the 
destruction of World War I1 prevented the convergence of productivity levels 
of Japan and the United States. 
It should also be noted that the East Asian newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) can certainly be classified as “countries with the capacity to learn from 
foreign experience elsewhere  .” However, according to Saxonhouse’s data, Ja- 
pan’s productivity performance is superior to that of the East Asian NICs de- 
spite the fact that Japan’s level of productivity  is much higher.  Productivity 
levels thus may not be a decisive factor in explaining productivity growth. 
Saxonhouse cited his earlier work that Japan’s lack of intraindustry trade 
can be explained by “Japan’s distinctive factor endowments .” For readers un- 
familiar with Saxonhouse’s previous work, it would have been much better if 
he had elaborated on what those material and human endowments are. Besides 
Japan’s  own endowments, it  must  be stressed  that  the  lack of  neighboring 
countries with a similar level of development also hampers Japan’s intraindus- 
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try  trade.  A substantial  portion  of  intraindustry  trade is intrafirm  trade: the 
shipping of  parts and components back and forth across borders of  adjacent 
countries among subsidiaries of the same firm. Land access is a crucial ele- 
ment  in  the coordination  of  production  across  borders  because  turnaround 
time in transportation  by land is much faster than that by sea. Japan’s geo- 
graphic insularity and the absence of highly developed economies adjacent to 
Japan combined to hamper Japan’s intrafirm trade and intraindustry trade.  It 
should be noted that Japan’s recent wave of investment in the East Asian NICs 
has increased its intraindustry trade. However, the lack of land access between 
Japan and the East Asian NICs will continue to be an obstacle to intraindustry 
trade. 